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Software engineering of modular robotic systems is a challenging task, however, verifying that the de-
veloped components all behave as they should individually and as a whole presents its own unique set
of challenges. In particular, distinct components in a modular robotic system often require different
verification techniques to ensure that they behave as expected. Ensuring whole system consistency
when individual components are verified using a variety of techniques and formalisms is difficult.
This paper discusses how to use compositional verification to integrate the various verification tech-
niques that are applied to modular robotic software, using a First-Order Logic (FOL) contract that
captures each component’s assumptions and guarantees. These contracts can then be used to guide
the verification of the individual components, be it by testing or the use of a formal method. We
provide an illustrative example of an autonomous robot used in remote inspection. We also discuss a
way of defining confidence for the verification associated with each component.
1 Introduction
Autonomous robotic systems are being used more frequently in safety-critical scenarios. Examples in-
clude monitoring offshore structures [16], nuclear inspection and decommissioning [4], and space ex-
ploration [31]. Ensuring that the software which controls the robot behaves as it should is crucial, par-
ticularly as modern robotic systems become more modular, and are deployed alongside humans in both
safety- and mission-critical scenarios.
Robotic software is often developed using a middleware to facilitate interoperability, such as ROS1 or
GenoM2. They share some abstract concepts [26], namely that systems are composed of communicating
components. The approach that we describe in this paper is not restricted to any particular robotic
middleware, instead it can be applied to a range of modular systems.
Distinct components in a modular system often require different verification techniques, ranging from
software testing to formal methods. In fact, integrating (formal and non-formal) verification techniques
is crucial particularly for robotic applications [14]. It is essential for the verification to be carried out
using the most suitable technique or formalism for each component. However, performing compositional
verification via linking heterogeneous verification results of individual components is difficult and the
current state-of-the-art for robotic software development does not provide an easy way of achieving this.
Our approach is to construct a high-level First-Order Logic (FOL) contract specification of the sys-
tem. The FOL contract describes the expected input, required output, and Assume-Guarantee [19] con-
ditions for each component. This abstract specification can be seen as a logical prototype for individual
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components and, via our calculus for chaining individual specifications, the entire modular system. Once
the FOL contracts have been checked for consistency, they can be used to guide the verification of each
component. This involves ensuring that the verification encodes the assumptions and guarantees as, for
example, test cases, assertions, or formal properties.
Our approach can be used in a Top-Down manner, to guide the system’s development from abstract
specification to concrete implementation, via verification; or in a Bottom-Up fashion, to check the con-
sistency of existing verification techniques. In this paper we present a Top-Down example. Our approach
enables developers to choose the most suitable verification technique for each component, but also to link
the conditions being verified across the whole system.
The next section presents background and related work. Section 3 describes our contribution for
specifying modular systems using contracts written in FOL; then, we illustrate our approach via a simple
remote inspection example. In Section 4 we discuss how the use of distinct forms of verification (e.g.,
testing, simulation, formal methods, etc.) affects our confidence in the verification results for the whole
system. Finally, Section 5 concludes and outlines future directions.
2 Background and Related Work
Modular robotic systems that are used in safety- or mission-critical scenarios require robust verification
techniques to ensure and certify that they behave as intended. These techniques encompass a range of
software engineering tools and methodologies: from practical testing and simulation, through to formal
verification [20, 14]. For example, to show that a property always holds: model-checkers [9] exhaustively
explore the search space, and theorem provers [3] use mathematical proof. These techniques offer a
means for proving that the software system is correct, which can be used as evidence to improve public
trust or to gain certification, as needed. Formal verification can be applied to the implemented system;
or to an abstract specification, which can then be further refined to program code.
Many formal methods exist, and most follow a simple paradigm: if the program is executed in a state
satisfying a given property (the pre-condition), then it will terminate in a state that satisfies another prop-
erty (the post-condition) [13]. It is up to the software engineer to specify these properties (sometimes
referred to as assumptions and guarantees, respectively). The Assume-Guarantee (or Rely-Guarantee)
approach [19] enables components to be assessed (verified) individually and then the separate assess-
ments to be combined, potentially under some assumption about the underlying concurrency. To com-
bine assessments, specifications of a component’s pre- and post-conditions are needed; this is similar to
the notion of Hoare logic that underlies these techniques [17]. In this work, we refer to this combination
of assumption/pre-condition and guarantee/post-condition as a contract that must be preserved.
Our work takes inspiration from Broy’s logical approach to systems engineering [5, 6] in which he
distinguishes three kinds of artefacts: (1) system-level requirements, (2) functional system specifica-
tion, and (3) logical subsystem architecture. Each of these artefacts is represented as a logical pred-
icate in the form of assertions, with relationships defined between them which he then extends to as-
sume/commitment contracts. His treatment of these contracts is purely logical [6], and, in this paper, we
present a similar technique that is specialised to the software engineering of modular robotic systems.
In [21], a workflow is proposed for systematically verifying the design of models of a cyber-physical
system using a combination of formal refinement and model-checking. Our work also deals with several
different levels of abstraction, but we tackle the use of compositional verification in modular systems.
Recent work has analysed a portion of the literature and identified common patterns that appear in
robotic missions (e.g. patrolling and obstacle avoidance) [22]. They provide verified LTL/CTL specifica-























Figure 1: We specify the contract for each component. Here we denote the assumption/pre-condition by A (i)
and the guarantee/post-condition by G (o). These contracts are used to guide the verification approach applied to
each component, denoted by dashed lines, such as software testing for a black-box implementation (Component
1). The solid arrows represent data flow. Note that we use the bar notation (i,o) to indicate a vector of variables.
tions for these commonly found missions which can then be reused in future developments. Further, it is
not clear how their support for compositional verification can be extended to support heterogeneous com-
ponents such as those in our example. Related work includes the identification of Event-B specification
clones in cyber physical system specifications [15].
Other compositional approaches include OCRA [8], AGREE [10], CoCoSpec [7], SIMPAL [29],
DRONA [12], and a methodology to decompose a system into assume-guarantee contracts that are then
validated through simulation [27], however, none explicitly incorporates heterogeneous techniques.
3 A First-Order Logic Framework
No single verification approach suits every component in a modular robotic system [14]. Components
such as hardware interfaces or planners may be amenable to formal verification, whereas, sensors may
require software testing or simulation-based testing.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we could use logical specifications (e.g. temporal logic), model-based speci-
fications (e.g. Event-B [1] or Z [28]), or algebraic specifications (e.g. CSP [18] or CASL[24]) amongst
others to specify the components in the system. Each of these formalisms offers its own range of benefits,
and each tends to suit the verification of particular types of behaviour. Also, we may only have access to
the black-box or white-box implementation of a component.
Our approach facilitates the use of compositional verification techniques for the components in mod-
ular robotic systems. We achieve this by specifying high-level contracts in FOL and we employ temporal
logic for reasoning about the combination of these contracts. In this way, we attach the assumptions over
the input (A (i)) and guarantees over the output (G (o)) to individual components (see Fig. 1).
3.1 A Calculus for Chaining Component Specifications
Specifically, we use typed FOL, potentially with the addition of algebraic operators, to specify assump-
tions and guarantees. For each component, C, we specify AC(iC) and GC(oC) where iC is a variable
representing the input to the component, oC is a variable representing the output from the component,
and AC(iC) and GC(oC) are FOL formulae describing the assumptions and guarantees, respectively.
Each individual component, C, obeys the following implication:
∀ iC,oC ·AC(iC)[C]⇒ ♦GC(oC)
where iC and oC are the inputs and outputs, respectively, of C; AC(iC)[C] represents the execution of C
with the assumption AC(iC); and ‘♦’ is Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL)’s [25] “eventually” operator.
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So, this implication means that if the assumptions, AC(iC), hold in the specification or program code of
C, then upon execution of the component eventually the guarantee, GC(oC), will hold. Note that our use
of temporal operators here is motivated by the real-time nature of robotic systems and could be of use in
later extensions of this calculus for larger, more complex systems.
Components in a modular robotic architecture are ‘chained’ together so long as their types/requirements
match. Similarly, we can compose the contracts of individual components in a number of ways, the sim-
plest being a sequential composition. The basic way to describe such structures is to first have the
specification capture all of the input and output streams and then to describe how these are combined in
the appropriate inference rules. The proof rule, PR1, for such linkage is as expected:
∀ i1,o1. A1(i1) ⇒ ♦G1(o1)
∀ i2,o2. A2(i2) ⇒ ♦G2(o2)
o1 = i2
⊢ ∀ i2,o1. G1(o1) ⇒ A2(i2)
∀ i1,o2. A1(i1) ⇒ ♦G2(o2)
(PR1)
Intuitively, this states that if two components are sequentially composed with the output of the first equal
to the input of the second and the guarantee of the first implies the assumption of the second then, we
can deduce that the assumption of the first component implies that the guarantee of the second will
“eventually” hold.
The illustrative example that we present in the next section contains a neat, linear chain of compo-
nents and so it is easy to see how this proof rule works. But a realistic robotic system could be much
more complex than this. For example, a component might have multiple, branching output streams that
are each used as input to other distinct components. Thus, we propose PR2 to account for branching:
∀ i1,o1. A1(i1) ⇒ ♦G1(o1)
∀ i2,o2. A2(i2) ⇒ ♦G2(o2)
i2 ⊆ o1
⊢ ∀ i2,o1. G1(o1) ⇒ A2(i2)
∀ i1,o2. A1(i1) ⇒ ♦G2(o2)
(PR2)
Here, the input to the second component, i2, is a subset of the output, o1, of the first. We have also
devised other proof rules which are omitted here for brevity.
3.2 Remote Inspection Case Study
The various middleware often used to develop robotic systems enable the combination of subsystems,
potentially developed independently of one another. For example, an autonomous rover might have a
navigation subsystem that is responsible for traversing a planet’s surface, and a subsystem for sampling
and analysing rock and soil samples.
In this paper, we use the illustrative example of a simplified navigation subsystem for an autonomous
rover, whose goal is to perform remote inspection of particular targets, while avoiding any obstacles, on a
2D grid map that has been previously generated. This navigation subsystem is composed of components
for Detection, a Planner and a cognitive Agent. Fig. 2 illustrates this subsystem and outlines the abstract
FOL contract of each component to be verified.
Given the camera input and the size of the square grid to be explored, n, the specification of the
Detection component guarantees that it detects an obstacle at a particular coordinate if an obstacle actu-
ally exists (in the physical or simulated environment) at that point. Note that we assume the existence
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Detection
iD: camera input, size of square grid to be explored (n)
oD : Grid = {(x,y)},Obstacles = {(x,y)},s0 = (x,y)
AD(iD) : n ∈ N
GD(oD) : ∀x,y · (x,y) ∈ Obstacles ⇒ obstacle(x,y)
∧ Grid ⊆N×N ∧ Obstacles ⊆ Grid ∧ s0 ∈ Grid
∧ s0 /∈ Obstacles ∧ ∀x,y · (x,y) ∈ Grid ⇒ x < n ∧ y < n
Planner
iP: oD
oP: PlanSet = {{(x,y)}}
AP(iP) : GD(oD)
GP(oP) : ∀p ·p ∈ PlanSet ⇒ p ⊆ Grid \Obstacles ∧ s0 ∈ p
∧ ∃p0 ·p0 ∈ p ∧ adjacent(s0 ,p0)
∀p1 ·p1 ∈ p ∧ p1 6= s0 ⇒
(∃r,s · r ∈ p ∧ s ∈ p ∧ adjacent(r,p1) ∧ adjacent(p1 ,s))
Agent
iA: oP
oA: plan = {(x,y)}
AA(iA) : GP(oP)
GA(oA) : plan ∈ PlanSet ∧ ∀q ·q ∈ PlanSet ⇒| plan |≤| q |
oD
oP
1 Event Planner =̂ordinary
2 any p
3 where
4 grd1: goal 6= s0 ∧ goal ∈ p
5 grd2: p ⊆ Grid \Obstacles ∧ s0 ∈ p
6 grd4: ∃p0 ·p0 ∈ p ∧ adjacent(s0 7→ p0)
7 grd6: ∀p1 ·p1 ∈ p ∧ p1 6= s0 ∧ p1 6= goal
⇒ (∃r,s · r ∈ p ∧ s ∈ p ∧ adjacent(r 7→ p1) ∧
adjacent(p1 7→ s))
8 grd5: ∃p2 ·p2 ∈ p ∧ adjacent(p2 7→ goal)
9 then
10 act1: PlanSet := PlanSet ∪ {p}
Figure 2: An overview of the robotic system to be verified. On the far left, each rectangle represents a component,
and each arrow represents data flow between components. To the right of each individual component, we sum-
marise the is, os, and their respective FOL contract. On the far right, we provide an Event-B event specification
corresponding to the Planner. Here, ‘ 7→’ denotes tuples.
of the obstacle(x,y) function to represent this physical or simulated observation. Further, the Detection
component outputs the rover’s current location, denoted by s0, and guarantees that s0 is in the grid and
does not coincide with an obstacle.
The Planner component produces a PlanSet whose elements are sets of coordinates capturing obstacle-
free plans under the assumption that the Detection component has produced a set of Obstacles that refers
to points that exist and contain an obstacle. The guarantee also ensures that each of these plans (sets
of coordinates) in PlanSet can be transformed into a sequence of coordinates where each is adjacent to
the previous. Note that we use sets here rather than sequences because sequences may contain duplicate
entries whereas sets cannot, and so our specification rules out the case where a plan loops.
The specification of the cognitive Agent component states that, under the assumption that all potential
plans in the PlanSet are obstacle-free, then it chooses a plan from the PlanSet and that this plan is, in
fact, the shortest one available. Note that we use | plan | to denote the length of plan.
The far right of Fig. 2 contains an Event-B event specification [1] of the Planner component. Notice
that the high-level FOL contract that we have written is captured in the Event-B specification as guards
on lines 5–7. The FOL contract has been refined and the Event-B specification has a notion of a goal that
it must plan paths towards. This has resulted in the extra guards on lines 1 and 8. This is an excerpt from
a larger Planner specification that we have verified via theorem proving in the Rodin Platform [2].
In this illustrative example, we formally verified the Planner contracts using Event-B and the Agent
contracts using the Gwendolen agent programming language [11]. The Detection component would
be verified via standard software testing practices and simulation-based testing since it may contain a
learning component which cannot be formally verified.
In §3.1, we presented rules about how we chain contracts together. In this example, two applications
of PR1 would allow us to derive the following property:
∀ iD,oA ·AC(iD)⇒ ♦GA(oA)
meaning that if the Detection component receives valid input then the Agent will eventually return the
shortest path from the start to the goal position in the grid.
We have shown how FOL can be used as a unifying language for the high-level Assume-Guarantee
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specification of components in a modular robotic system. A top-down approach to software engineering
of such a robotic system would begin with these FOL contracts. Then, each contract would be further re-
fined [23], ideally to a more detailed formal specification and, eventually to its concrete implementation.
4 Confidence in Verification
When linking the results from multiple verification techniques a key question becomes how using these
different techniques affects our confidence in the verification of the whole system. One might think that
a formal proof of correctness corresponds to a higher level of confidence than simple testing methods
(especially over unbounded environments). However, formal verification is usually only feasible on an
abstraction of the system whereas testing can be carried out on the implemented code. Therefore, it is
our view that we achieve higher levels of confidence in verification when multiple verification methods
have been employed for each component in the system [30].
Component Testing Simulation-Based Testing Formal Methods
Detection X ✗ ✗
Planner X X X
Cognitive Agent X X X
Table 1: Verification techniques applied to each component.
We have broadly partitioned current verification techniques into three categories: testing, simulation-
based testing and formal methods. We have determined which of these techniques might be employed
for each component in our example as shown in Table 1. Examining how this metric can be calculated
for more complex systems with loops is a future direction for this work.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented an initial description of a framework for compositional verification of modular sys-
tems using FOL as a unifying language. FOL contracts are used to guide the verification techniques
applied to each component. We have briefly illustrated this by verifying and refining the FOL contract
for the Planner component using Event-B in our example of a remote inspection rover. Furthermore, we
introduce the notion of confidence in verification techniques and provide a broad categorisation.
Future work includes assessing how well our approach scales to industrial-sized robotic systems de-
velopment. Also, ensuring that our approach is usable by developers and understandable by certification
organisations is crucial to its use and success. This needs tool support for writing and reasoning about
the FOL contracts, with similar functionality to an IDE, integrated robotic development other tools. We
will also demonstrate the approach with a wider variety of verification techniques. Our illustrative ex-
ample employs an event-based style of communication, however, we intend to explore how to extend our
approach to stream-based communications as future work.
Finally, our proposed method could be used to generate runtime monitors to check that each compo-
nent’s contract holds during execution. If a contract is violated, the monitor could flag this to the robot’s
operator (if one exists) or trigger a mitigating action (if the robot is autonomous). This could augment
the verification of components that can only be verified at a low level of confidence, or aid in fault finding
when diagnosing failures.
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